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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 





R.I., INC.,  
d/b/a 
Seating Solutions;  
LISA SUPRINA, in her official capacity as President  
and individual capacity as a citizen of the United States;  
SCOTT SUPRINA, in his official capacity as Vice President  
and individual capacity as a citizen of the United States;  
TONY ENGLISH, in his official capacity as Secretary  
and his individual capacity as a citizen of the United States, 
 




MICHAEL MCCARTHY, in his individual capacity and  
official capacity as Director of NJDOL;  
RAYMOND SMID, in his individual capacity and  
official capacity as Section Chief NJDOL;  
THEODORE E. TARDIFF, in his individual capacity  
and official capacity as Supervisor NJDOL 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 06-cv-01021) 
District Judge:  Honorable Peter G. Sheridan 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 25, 2012 
 




(Filed:  May 29, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 R.I., Inc., doing business as Seating Solutions, along with Lisa Suprina, Scott 
Suprina, and Tony English (collectively, Plaintiffs), appeal the District Court’s summary 
judgment.  Because we agree with the District Court that Defendants Michael McCarthy, 
Raymond Smid, and Theodore Tardiff are entitled to qualified immunity, we will affirm. 
I 
 We recite only the essential facts and procedural history of the case, and we do so 
in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs against whom summary judgment was entered.  
E.g., Mabey Bridge & Shore, Inc. v. Schoch, 666 F.3d 862, 866 n.2 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing 
Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 489 n.1 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
A 
 Plaintiffs are a company that installs spectator seating and three of its officers.  
Defendants are three former officials of the New Jersey Department of Labor and 
Workforce Development (NJDOL).  During the relevant time periods, McCarthy was the 
Director of the Division of Wage and Hour Compliance, Smid was his subordinate and 




 In 2005, the employees of Seating Solutions formed a union and the union entered 
into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the company’s management.  The 
CBA contained an Appendix A in which the union relinquished its rights under federal 
and state prevailing wage laws in exchange for a guarantee of year-round work for its 
members who met certain requirements.  Around that time, the local carpenters’ union 
had a meeting with Scott Suprina at which it asserted its belief that the carpenters were 
entitled to the Seating Solutions work and implied that it would retaliate if Seating 
Solutions did not meet its demands.  Seating Solutions did not hire the carpenters’ union.  
The carpenters then filed a complaint against Seating Solutions with the NJDOL, which 
initiated an investigation into the company’s work on various projects. 
 The investigation was conducted pursuant to the NJDOL’s responsibility to 
enforce the New Jersey Prevailing Wage Act (PWA), 1963 N.J. Laws ch. 150 (codified as 
amended at N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-56.25 et seq.).  The PWA provides civil penalties for 
contractors who fail to pay the “prevailing wage” on public-works contracts.  N.J. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 34:11-56.35, -56.36, -56.40, -56.47.  The prevailing wage is defined as “the wage 
rate paid by virtue of collective bargaining agreements by employers employing a 
majority of workers of that craft or trade subject to said collective bargaining agreements, 
in the locality in which the public work is done.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-56.26(9).  The 
commissioner of the NJDOL periodically sets the prevailing wage for each trade in each 
locality and has the authority to enforce the PWA.  N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 34:11-56.30 to -
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56.31.  After notice and a hearing on an alleged violation, for example, the commissioner 
may revoke or suspend a contractor’s registration or require the contractor to post a surety 
bond.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-56.56. 
 During the investigation, the NJDOL ordered Seating Solutions to produce various 
documents.  In August 2005, Tardiff recommended that Seating Solutions be debarred, 
that is, prohibited from conducting public work.  McCarthy approved this 
recommendation and Plaintiffs were sent the required notices, which assessed penalties, 
fees, and additional wages for failure to comply with the PWA.  A state administrative 
law judge (ALJ) held a hearing on the proposed debarment and subsequently issued an 
order upholding the assessed amounts and debarring Plaintiffs for three years.  The New 
Jersey courts affirmed the ALJ’s decision. 
B 
 Plaintiffs filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of New York in 2005.  The case was transferred to the District of 
New Jersey in early 2006.  In March 2007, the District Court bifurcated the case, 
dismissing the complaint pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine insofar as it sought 
injunctive and declaratory relief, and staying the matter to the extent that it sought money 
damages.  The Court reopened the case in 2009, and after a period of discovery granted 
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.  Plaintiffs 
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filed this timely appeal.1
II 
 
 Plaintiffs raise several challenging preemption arguments, in essence contending 
that Defendants’ actions infringed upon their federal rights conferred by the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 151 et seq.), and the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 61 Stat. 136 (1947) 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq.).  In particular, they argue that the 
preemption doctrines articulated in Lodge 76, International Ass’n of Machinists & 
Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 427 U.S. 132 
(1976), San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), and § 301 
of the LMRA prohibited the actions of Defendants.2
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction over this suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, the 
District Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction was not impeded by the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine, at least because the federal complaint was filed before the state-court 
proceedings concluded.  Consequently, this is not a “case[] brought by state-court losers 
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court 
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those 
judgments.”  Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). 
  These are interesting arguments, but 
 
2 Machinists “proscribes state regulation and state-law causes of action concerning 
conduct that Congress intended to be unregulated, conduct that was to remain a part of the 
self-help remedies left to the combatants in labor disputes.”  Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 
U.S. 491, 499 (1983) (citations omitted).  Under Garmon,  
 
state regulations and causes of action are presumptively preempted if they 
concern conduct that is actually or arguably either prohibited or protected by 
the [NLRA].  The state regulation or cause of action may, however, be 
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we need not reach them.  Assuming arguendo that the NLRA or LMRA preempts the 
PWA as applied to the facts of this case, thereby providing Plaintiffs with a federal right, 
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from suit because that right is not clearly 
established. 
 We review the grant of qualified immunity on summary judgment de novo.  
Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 298 (3d Cir. 2000).  “The qualified immunity doctrine 
‘protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct 
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known.’”  Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). 
 “A right is clearly established for qualified immunity purposes where its contours 
are ‘sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing 
violates that right.’”  Sharp, 669 F.3d at 159 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 
(2001)).  Because those contours are frequently delineated by decisional law, we look to 
past cases to discern whether a right is clearly established.  See, e.g., Bayer v. Monroe 
                                                                                                                                                             
sustained if the behavior to be regulated is behavior that is of only peripheral 
concern to the federal law or touches interests deeply rooted in local feeling 
and responsibility. 
 
Id. at 498 (citation omitted).  Finally, § 301 of the LMRA requires that “if the resolution 
of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement, the 
application of state law . . . is pre-empted and federal labor-law principles—necessarily 
uniform throughout the Nation—must be employed to resolve the dispute.”  Lingle v. 
Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405–06 (1988). 
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Cnty. Children & Youth Servs., 577 F.3d 186, 192–93 (3d Cir. 2009); Egolf v. Witmer, 
526 F.3d 104, 110 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing McLaughlin v. Watson, 271 F.3d 566, 571 (3d 
Cir. 2001)); McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 173 (3d Cir. 2006).  However, “[i]n some 
cases, even though there may be no previous precedent directly on point, an action can 
still violate a clearly established right where a general constitutional rule already 
identified in the decisional law applies with obvious clarity.”  Sharp, 669 F.3d at 159 
(citing Williams v. Bitner, 455 F.3d 186, 191 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
 The same paradigm applies to the statutory rules at issue here.  We have not found, 
nor have Plaintiffs cited, any precedent holding that the PWA is preempted by federal 
labor law.  And there is no dispute that Defendants acted within the authority of the 
NJDOL pursuant to the PWA.  Although compliance with state law will not render an 
official automatically immune from suit, see Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 209 n.7 
(3d Cir. 2003) (citing Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 107 n.2 
(2001)), such compliance—where there has never been a suggestion of 
unconstitutionality—is highly indicative of entitlement to qualified immunity. 
 State-law compliance aside, the complexity of NLRA and LMRA preemption in 
the wage-law setting entitles Defendants to qualified immunity.  Two Ninth Circuit cases 
reveal the nuances of NLRA preemption in this context.  In Bechtel Construction, Inc. v. 
United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, 812 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1987), 
the court considered “whether a bargained-for wage reduction, approved by all parties to 
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a collective bargaining agreement, must yield to the law of California, which authorizes a 
state Division of Apprenticeship Standards to establish a schedule of wages to be paid to 
indentured apprentices.”  Id. at 1221.  Observing that under Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985), some state-imposed minimum labor standards 
are not preempted by the NLRA, the court nevertheless concluded that the wage standards 
at issue were preempted because the state agency could approve negotiated lower 
minimums.  Therefore, the set minimum was not a “true minimum.”  Id. at 1225–26.  
Twelve years later, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the NLRA preempted the 
California apprentice prevailing wage law.  Dillingham Constr. N.A., Inc. v. Cnty. of 
Sonoma, 190 F.3d 1034, 1036–37 (9th Cir. 1999).  The court reached the opposite result, 
holding that the law was not preempted.  Id. at 1037.  In doing so, it distinguished Bechtel 
because the law at issue in Dillingham did, in fact, “establish[] true legal minimums.”  Id. 
at 1040–41. 
 Bechtel and Dillingham demonstrate that preemption of prevailing wage laws 
depends on the details of the law at issue.  See Assoc. Builders & Contractors of S. Cal., 
Inc. v. Nunn, 356 F.3d 979, 986–91 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the apprentice minimum 
wage on private projects was not preempted by the NLRA); Rondout Elec., Inc. v. NYS 
Dep’t of Labor, 335 F.3d 162, 167–69 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that a New York prevailing 
wage regulation was not subject to Machinists preemption); Chamber of Commerce of the 
U.S. v. Bragdon, 64 F.3d 497, 504 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding a county prevailing wage 
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ordinance was preempted by the NLRA because it reached “beyond the parameters of its 
own public works projects to regulate wholly private construction projects”).  Therefore, 
absent case law specifically tailoring the application of the PWA on the basis of a 
federally conferred labor right, any federal right to be free from PWA regulation that 
Plaintiffs possessed was not “clearly established” when Defendants undertook their 
discretionary enforcement actions. 
 One of our own cases further illustrates this point.  In Keystone Chapter, 
Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Foley, 37 F.3d 945 (3d Cir. 1994), we held 
that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 
88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.), did not preempt 
Pennsylvania’s prevailing wage law, thereby rejecting the theory that the state law 
impermissibly affects the employer’s ability to provide a benefits plan.  Id. at 963–64.  
The plaintiffs asserted that the NLRA also preempted the state law, but the district court 
dismissed that claim and the plaintiffs did not challenge the dismissal on appeal.  Id. at 
952 & n.10.  We nevertheless had occasion to discuss, in dicta, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Building & Construction Trades Council of the Metropolitan District v. 
Associated Builders & Contractors of Massachusetts/Rhode Island, Inc., 507 U.S. 218 
(1993), in which the Court held that “a bid specification by a Massachusetts state 
authority, requiring bidders to abide by a particular labor agreement, was not preempted 
by the” NLRA.  Keystone, 37 F.3d at 955 n.15.  Although we did not have to resolve the 
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Trades Council argument that the state was acting as a market participant and therefore its 
laws could not be preempted, we characterized it as a “novel argument” that was unlikely 
to succeed because it would be odd for the state to raise its own costs if it were acting as a 
market participant.  Id.; see also Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 421–26 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (discussing Keystone and the market-participant exception to preemption under 
the NLRA en route to the conclusion that Delaware was acting as a market regulator, and 
not a participant, when it enacted regulations pursuant to its prevailing wage law). 
 We do not raise Bechtel, Dillingham, and Keystone to suggest that the preemption 
argument advanced by Plaintiffs here could not be successful, but merely to highlight the 
novelty of the issues and the complexity of “preemption under the NLRA, which has no 
explicit preemption provision.”  Keystone, 37 F.3d at 955 n.15.  The federal right asserted 
by Plaintiffs implicates subtle issues of preemption in the labor context, including such 
questions as whether the NJDOL was acting as a market participant, whether the 
enforcement of the PWA interferes with the collective bargaining process, and whether a 
periodically recalculated prevailing wage is a minimum labor standard.  Where such 
complexity meets a dearth of legal precedent specific to the PWA, we cannot conclude 
that Plaintiffs had “clearly established” rights such that Defendants were “plainly 
incompetent or . . . knowingly violate[d] the law” in carrying out their job duties.  Malley 




 For the aforementioned reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
